{"id":1190640,"date":"2026-10-21T10:26:02","date_gmt":"2026-10-21T17:26:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cm-edgetun.pages.dev\/en-us\/research\/publication\/countersteer-suppressing-indirect-prompt-injection-with-activation-steering\/"},"modified":"2026-10-22T15:44:34","modified_gmt":"2026-10-22T22:44:34","slug":"countersteer-suppressing-indirect-prompt-injection-with-activation-steering","status":"publish","type":"msr-research-item","link":"https:\/\/cm-edgetun.pages.dev\/en-us\/research\/publication\/countersteer-suppressing-indirect-prompt-injection-with-activation-steering\/","title":{"rendered":"CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steering"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that suppresses this behavior inside the model. Per model, a five-step recipe fits a residual-stream direction from paired episodes differing only in whether an embedded instruction is followed, and retains it only if it passes pre-specified causal and capability gates. At deployment, the direction is subtracted from every tool-result token during prefill. The edit is always on&#8211;there is no detection decision to evade&#8211;and requires no fine-tuning, auxiliary model, or added tokens, only white-box serving and tool-result span boundaries. Across five open-weights models (8B-106B, five vendor lineages), held-out attack success falls from 0.21-1.00 undefended to 0.00-0.17 defended, and AgentDojo compromise rate from 0.10-0.49 to 0.006-0.079, at 93-100% typography-normalized benign utility, with larger task-dependent costs when reasoning over steered content. A benchmark-level adaptive attacker reaching 0.67-0.73 undefended is held to roughly a quarter of that on the two most deeply evaluated models. Among the defenses we measured on capable models, those achieving lower compromise rates either lost 22-89% of benign utility or fine-tuned the served weights. White-box gradient attacks through the deployed vector compromise at most 2 of 52 episodes, and none of 2,052 replayed human red-team attacks succeeds. CounterSteer largely neutralizes instructional takeover: a black-box framing search cracks 3 of 18 development samples. Parameter manipulation&#8211;attacker-chosen arguments in otherwise legitimate calls&#8211;is only partially resisted (13 of 18); the decision becomes linearly readable at argument emission but not at the examined pre-generation sites, and is not removed by the tested prefill- or decode-time steering, motivating argument-provenance controls.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that suppresses this behavior inside the model. Per model, a five-step recipe fits a residual-stream direction from paired episodes differing only in whether an embedded instruction is followed, and retains it only if it passes pre-specified [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"msr-url-field":"","msr-podcast-episode":"","msrModifiedDate":"","msrModifiedDateEnabled":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"_classifai_error":"","msr-author-ordering":[{"type":"text","value":"M. 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